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Abstract
There is a high-profile body of work asserting a link between anthropogenic 
climate change and increased rates of violence. There is also an expanding 
literature that is highly skeptical of this research. Critics point out that (1) this 
research has so far produced widely divergent findings, and that there is no 
consensus on a causal link between climate and the incidence of conflict. Critics 
also argue that much climate violence research (2) draws upon a long-discredited 
environmental determinism, (3) rehashes colonial stereotypes of the global 
South, (4) naturalizes and depoliticizes inequalities within and between nations, 
and (5) potentially creates new rationales for militarism and intervention from 
more powerful states. In the following essay, I build on these critiques, arguing 
that orthodox climate conflict research also focuses unduly on the potential 
climate-related violence of the poor, overlooking the violence of the powerful. 
Drawing from a climate justice perspective, I advocate for more study on the 
structural violence of climate change. To make this case, I focus on the world’s 
largest publicly traded fossil fuel companies.
Keywords: climate conflict, climate justice, fossil fuel corporations, fossil fuel 
divestment, structural violence
Introduction
Will climate change make the world a more violent place? This is one of the 
more important questions of our time. There are a growing number of warnings 
coming from influential places about the relationship between climate change 
and violence. The United States government, for instance, has increasingly 
labeled global warming a “threat multiplier” (Banusiewicz, 2014; CNA, 2007). 
1  Author contact: ebonds@umw.edu
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Additionally, prominent journalists and policy analysts at important think tanks 
and advocacy groups have worked to highlight potential connections between 
global warming and conflict (see for instance EJF, 2014; Friedman, 2013; 
Werrell & Fernia, 2013). And headlines at major newspapers, for example in 
the Washington Post, report “there’s a surprisingly strong link between climate 
change and violence” (Mooney, 2014).
But how we answer the question—“will climate change create a more violent 
future?”—has much to do with the definitions we use. On one hand, the jury is 
very much out in terms of proving a causal relationship between climate change 
and increasing conflict. While some research, published in some of the world’s 
most prestigious journals, has found what the authors describe as a strong link 
between climatic changes and rates of violence (see Burke et al., 2009; Hsiang 
et al., 2013), other research, sometimes published in the same journals, has found 
no such correlation (Buhaug, 2010a, 2010b; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014). There 
is, in fact, no consensus among quantitative researchers about the existence of a 
causal link between changes in temperature and rainfall and increasing violence 
(Buhaug, 2015; Selby, 2014). As the body of research on a potential climate 
violence relationship has grown, so too has the number of its critics.
An increasing number of authors worry that quantitative climate conflict research, 
as the next reincarnation of a long-discredited environmental determinism, is 
simply old wine in a new bottle (Hartmann, 2014; Raleigh et al., 2014). Moreover, 
according to critics, this research draws upon colonial stereotypes of the global 
South, implying that its peoples are somehow more predisposed to violence 
than those of European ancestry (Livingstone, 2015; Raleigh et al., 2014; Selby, 
2014; Verhoeven, 2014). Finally, this research implies that the violence of poor 
people in the most peripheral areas of the global economy is “natural,” hiding 
from view the ways that histories of colonialism and the contemporary global 
political economy have conditioned and produced violent conflict (Hartmann, 
2010, 2014; Verhoeven, 2011, 2014). Why, given all these problems, has orthodox 
climate conflict research continued to flourish, and to enjoy such a high public 
profile? Critics warn that this is because the perspective so closely matches, and 
is so useful to, governments that are securitizing the issue of climate change and 
using it as a means to legitimate militarism and ongoing interventions in the 
global South (Hartmann, 2010, 2014; Selby, 2014; Verhoeven, 2014).
Given all the problems with orthodox climate violence research, does this mean 
that it is safe to say that climate change will not make the world a more violent 
place? Hardly. I advance instead that anthropogenic climate change is itself a 
kind of violence (Solnit, 2014). After all, it will certainly cause early deaths and 
it will drive people from their homes and homelands, all of which will cause 
untold suffering. Drawing upon a climate justice perspective, I provide here a 
brief overview of orthodox climate conflict research and further describe its 
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critics’ concerns. I add to their critique by arguing that this body of research, 
as a whole, focuses almost exclusively on the potential violence of the poor, 
overlooking the violence of the wealthy and powerful groups who benefit most 
from, and actively work to sustain, a fossil fuel–dependent neoliberal capitalism. 
To begin amending this bias in the climate violence literature, I draw upon work 
in sociology, green criminology, and geography to argue that major fossil fuel 
companies are disproportionately responsible for, and have disproportionately 
benefited from, the structural violence of climate change.
Orthodox climate violence research and its critics
There is a long line of argumentation in social/environmental research, going 
back to Malthus (1798), making a link between environmental scarcity and 
violent conflict. Many contemporary investigators looking at climate change are 
doing work that is largely in alignment with this long-standing research trend. 
The argument is basically that climate change will act as a stressor in the larger 
environment that, along with other important conditions, will make large-scale 
violence more likely. It is important to note that most analysts are not alleging 
that there is a direct causal relationship between climate change and violence, 
but that climate change is an important background force that heightens other 
risk factors associated with conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Some studies in this 
body of research simply try to make the point that the relationship exists, without 
going into depth to examine particular causal mechanisms (Burke et al., 2014; 
Hsiang et al., 2013).
Other studies try to look deeper into potential causal factors, arguing that 
weather aberrations—such as prolonged dry seasons, droughts, abnormally 
high temperatures, or excessive rainfall—are associated with increased levels of 
conflict (Burke et al., 2009; Hendrix & Saleyhan, 2012; Hsiang et al., 2011; Kelley 
et al., 2015; Landis, 2012; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012). Such weather abnormalities, 
according to these researchers’ arguments, are consistent with climate change 
models and could become the “new normal” in years ahead. These changes in 
the weather might drive conflict, they explain, by negatively impacting crop 
production and reducing food availability, thereby triggering migration or 
catalyzing resentments against governments or other ethnic groups. Or in another 
line of thinking, researchers argue that unusually hot and dry weather associated 
with climate change could drive pastoralists out of their traditional homelands 
and into conflict over land and water resources with agricultural communities.
While a large number of studies posit a link between climate change and 
violence, there is by no means a consensus among researchers. For one, several 
notable studies find little-to-no support for the relationship when other standard 
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predictors for the onset of violence are factored in, such as (1) levels of economic 
development, (2) ethno-political exclusion practiced by governments, (3) time 
period (for instance, accounting for the end of the Cold War), and (4) levels of 
conflict in nearby countries (Buhaug, 2010a; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014). Other 
studies find a limited relationship between weather and conflict, but it is very 
weak compared to those associated with more conventional variables (Klomp & 
Bulte, 2013; O’Loughlin et al., 2014).
In fact, some research finds the opposite. Gartzke (2012, p. 177) analyzed global 
temperature trends in relation to rates of conflict over the past 200 years and 
found that “global warming is associated with a reduction in interstate conflict.” 
Humans have, after all, been warming the climate since the beginning of the 
industrial revolution, but during this time per capita rates of violence have been 
declining (see Pinker, 2011). Of course, Gartzke does not actually believe that a 
warming planet necessarily increases harmony between nations, but rather that 
industrialization—achieved by burning fossil fuels and inadvertently warming 
the planet—has brought about greater prosperity and a decreasing tendency for 
governments to go to war. Buhaug (2010b) comes to a similar conclusion when 
comparing the increasing temperature trends in Africa over the past 30 years in 
relation to the diminishing frequency of both large and small civil wars (in which 
the numbers of fatalities have also been diminishing).
These findings illustrate that there is no clear consensus that a relationship exists 
between climate change and rates of violence, as both Buhaug (2015) and Selby 
(2014) confirm in separate reviews of the literature. To Buhaug (2015, p. 269), 
this has much to do with the fact that “climate and conflict are not connected 
in the simple and direct manner as sometimes portrayed,” and that therefore 
climate conflict researchers need to do a better job of attending to how political 
and economic forces mitigate or increase climate vulnerability (see also Raleigh, 
2010). Buhaug also explains that the widely divergent, and often contradictory, 
findings in orthodox climate violence research are often caused by analysts’ 
tendency to universalize potential variables, neglecting for instance how changes 
in rainfall or temperature patterns could have very different effects depending 
upon the geography and political economy of particular regions. Similarly, 
Raleigh and her coauthors (2014, p. 76) point out that orthodox climate violence 
researchers often fail to specify what exactly constitutes conflict in the first place, 
writing that, “if the social setting that engenders conflict is ignored, there is also 
danger that multiple types of conflict become conflated. Conflict in wealthy areas 
can be reduced to the level of baseball skirmishes instead of large-scale societal 
violence.” While Buhaug (2015) and others think that orthodox climate violence 
research can be rescued by better use of theory and more fine-grained analysis, 
other critics argue that its problems run much deeper, and that looking at climate 
variability as a potential driver of conflict is a project that is best abandoned.
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As one of these critics, Hartmann (2010, p. 237) argues that “a certain exceptionalism 
is at work” in much orthodox climate conflict research, in which “it is commonly 
assumed that scarcity can lead to institutional and technological innovation in 
more affluent countries, [while] just the opposite is assumed for poor people in 
less affluent countries.” In this research narrative, according to Hartmann, scarcity 
renders people in poorer nations “into victims/villains, incapable of innovation 
or livelihood diversification and naturally prone to violence” (ibid.). Contrary to 
the orthodox climate violence narrative, Raleigh and her colleagues (2014, p. 77) 
write that the reality is typically quite the opposite. “People in poor countries 
do not respond to bad weather by attacking each other,” they contend. Rather, 
“on the ground in developing countries, climate change and ecological stress is 
treated as a problem to be solved, not a harbinger of apocalyptic violence” (ibid.). 
To these critics, this “research programme reflects and reproduces an ensemble of 
Northern stereotypes, ideologies and policy agendas” (Selby, 2014, p. 830).
Livingstone (2015) finds that such notions are not new. He looked back to the 
historical origins of today’s orthodox climate violence research and found that 
there are very old Northern ideas that people in more southerly latitudes are 
more predisposed to violence. This discourse, of course, is rooted in histories 
of racism and colonialism. And it was a very useful discourse indeed to colonial 
authorities who had to legitimate their undemocratic rule of foreign lands 
(Verhoeven, 2014). Similarly, according to critics, orthodox climate violence 
research is ideologically useful today because it tends to gloss over or hide how 
histories of colonialism, along with the operation of the contemporary global 
political economy, have created tremendous global inequalities and made some 
people much more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. According to 
Verhoeven (2011, p. 685), orthodox climate violence research:
Essentially absolves political actors from their responsibility in creating and 
sustaining the conditions that make people vulnerable to crises. It ignores the 
fact that a drought might push communities over the edge, but isn’t a real cause 
… it only triggers the final stage of a complex, drawn-out process of violent 
marginalization that benefits local, national and/or global elites.
In consequence, orthodox climate violence research depoliticizes global 
inequalities and their resulting climate vulnerabilities, making the potential 
violence of actors in the global South seem “natural” (Raleigh et al., 2014; Selby, 
2014; Verhoeven, 2014).
But, according to critics, the orthodox climate violence narrative has other 
ideological implications. Hartmann (2014, p. 775), for instance, worries that the 
“depiction of Africa as a continent under severe demographic, climate and security 
stresses helps to legitimise the intensification of monitoring and surveillance by 
the US intelligence community.” Hartmann also warns that the discourse could 
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be used as a means to further militarize United States foreign aid. Moreover, 
the prospect of ever-unfolding disasters and climate strife in the global South 
could be used as a rationale among more powerful nations in the global North to 
continue, or even increase, their high rates of spending on military equipment, 
rather than spending more money on climate mitigation to actually get at the 
root of the problem (Bonds, 2015).
Taken as a whole, then, while orthodox climate violence research is a growing 
area of study that has attracted a great deal of public attention, it has also 
been greeted by a growing number of critics who claim that it is beset by 
methodological, epistemological, and political/ethical problems. Beyond 
outlining these criticisms, the goal of this essay is to add one more concern: while 
orthodox climate violence research focuses on the potential violence of those in 
the global South whose lives will be most harmed by climate change, it overlooks 
the potentially climate-related violence of the powerful. If a speedy transition 
to a less carbon-intensive economy could slow rates of global warming, which 
would have the ultimate effect of saving lives and reducing the extent of climatic 
displacement, are deliberate efforts to prevent or slow this transition a kind of 
violence? Maintaining our current rates of emissions, after all, threatens human 
communities across the world. While orthodox climate violence research does 
not ask such questions, a climate justice perspective, drawing on the concept of 
structural violence, insists that we should.
The structural violence of climate change
Martin Luther King Jr. stated in a sermon he delivered in 1956 that “peace is not 
merely the absence of some negative force—war, tension, confusion—but it is the 
presence of some positive force–justice” (King, 1956). Both before and since King 
made this eloquent statement, philosophers and social activists have critiqued 
narrow conceptualizations of peace as the lack of armed hostilities and active 
fighting. Narrow definitions of peace, after all, overlook other more prevalent 
causes of death and suffering in the world. Johan Galtung (1969) brought this 
critique into the social sciences in a now classic essay in which he introduced the 
concept of “structural violence,” which he defined as the existence of suffering 
and death in the world that might otherwise be prevented. Structural violence, 
he argues, is caused when “resources are unevenly distributed, as when income 
distributions are heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical 
services existent in some districts and for some groups only, and so on” (Galtung, 
1969, p. 171). As Soron (2007) further explains, it is “the normal, unexceptional, 
anonymous, and often unscrutinized violence woven into the routine workings 
of prevailing power structures.”
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While death is inevitable and suffering for all people who live long enough is 
unavoidable, Galtung (1969, p. 168) focuses on preventable deaths and degrees 
of suffering as manifestations of structural inequalities, writing that, for instance, 
“if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to 
conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he 
dies from it today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence 
is present according to our definition.” Anthropologist and medical doctor Paul 
Farmer has put the concept to good use to study the tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS 
epidemics that needlessly kill millions of persons every year. Farmer’s (2003, 
2004) own focus is on Haiti, and the ways that its historical domination within the 
global political economy and its own internal inequalities—based on divisions of 
race, class, and gender—create a society that is ravaged by these diseases, which 
could be largely averted or at least made much less severe.
Both Galtung and Farmer insist that social scientists are introducing an important 
kind of bias in their research by focusing only on forms of violence that are 
intentionally and directly carried out. Certainly direct forms of violence are more 
immediately visible. Warfare, with its bombs and explosions and all the terrible 
wounds it creates, is often spectacular. It embodies a certain kind of drama that 
often draws and holds our attention (Galtung, 1969). Even so, both theorists warn 
that narrowly focusing on dramatic forms of direct violence will let the biggest 
killers in contemporary global society go free, and mostly unnoticed.
Typically, orthodox climate conflict research measures violence in terms of the 
numbers of persons killed in hostilities. There is no doubt that such killings are 
troubling, and any connection between climate change and the onset of violent 
clashes in the global South should be studied. But the almost exclusive focus on this 
potential connection in regard to climate-related violence is also disconcerting. 
After all, can we say that, if global warming continues unabated, the increasing 
numbers of children who will die from waterborne diseases is somehow peaceful, 
even if it does not trigger armed combat? Can we say that the millions of persons 
who will be forced to leave their homes and homelands due to rising ocean levels 
are going in peace, even if their migrations do not lead to war? And what about 
the growing rates of people expected to be killed or displaced by the increasing 
numbers of severe tropical storms? While they might suffer silently without 
raising arms, is this peace? Clearly not. But current research on climate-related 
violence is unmindful of the likelihood of such suffering and death. It misses the 
mark by failing to acknowledge that climate change is itself violent (Solnit, 2014).
Dennis Soron (2007), for one, has advocated for the study of the structural 
violence of climate change. Such violence is not committed with malice and intent. 
And its impacts will not be felt immediately, but only over the decades to come. 
The World Health Organization, for instance, predicts that 250,000 excess deaths 
per year will be indirectly caused by climate change between the years 2030 and 
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2050 (through, for example, increased childhood malnutrition, heat waves, and 
the spread of tropical diseases) (Hales et al., 2014). Obviously, these deaths will 
pale in comparison to those that will be linked to climate change beyond 2050 if 
current rates of warming continue. And needless to say, the bulk of these deaths 
will be experienced in the global South, among groups who contributed least to 
global warming but are also most vulnerable to its effects (Parr, 2014; Roberts & 
Parks, 2006).
To Soron (2007), the structural violence of climate change is created by the 
normal operation of global capitalism, in which corporate profits and economic 
growth have been prioritized over environmental well-being and justice (see also 
Klein, 2014; Lynch et al., 2013; Parr, 2014). For this reason, Soron (2007) argues:
Responding effectively to the structural violence of climate change will require a 
correspondingly structural program of social change, oriented not simply towards 
technological fixes, but towards achieving a greater degree of democratic control 
over economic life, refitting the scale of production and consumption to respect 
environmental limits.
There is a large body of work within both environmental sociology and green 
criminology that supports Soron’s approach: The inequalities necessarily part of 
capitalism and its emphasis upon economic growth regardless of environmental 
consequences mean that it is an unsustainable system that is imperiling whole 
ecosystems and entire human communities (see Foster, 2002; Gould et al., 2008; 
Lynch et  al., 2013; Stretesky et  al., 2013). At the same time, the climate crisis 
requires immediate action, and meaningful carbon reductions could technically 
be possible even within the social organization of capitalism (Parenti, 2013). For 
this reason, it is important to look for potential opportunities to intervene within 
this system to push it toward less carbon dependency.
Downey and Strife (2010) provide some important insights on how this goal might 
be achieved. While capitalism as a whole is unsustainable, they also explain that 
certain groups and institutions benefit disproportionately from environmentally 
degrading behaviors (e.g., resource extraction, the production of toxic pollution 
and carbon emissions). Downey and Strife therefore argue that social scientists 
should study how these groups and institutions organize themselves within 
capitalism to protect and promote their ability to profit from environmental 
degradation. Following their lead, I apply the concept of structural violence 
to large publicly traded corporations in the next section. While I acknowledge 
that capitalism itself produces structural violence through climate change and 
other environmental harms, I also make the case that these large corporations 
disproportionately benefit from, and are disproportionately responsible for, our 
contemporary inability to achieve more significant carbon reductions.
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Structural violence and fossil fuel corporations
Social sustainability science is typically the result of cross-pollination between 
environmental justice movements and academics, as each group draws upon and 
elaborates ideas and strategies used by the other (Martinez-Alier et  al., 2014). 
Climate justice activists, earth scientists, and, most unexpectedly, financial 
analysts have similarly co-developed a shared way of understanding the perilous 
nature of our climate’s future and the difficulties humanity faces in achieving 
a political solution to the crisis of climate change. Central here are the carbon 
reserves held by the world’s largest fossil fuel companies, along with the political 
power that they wield.
In 2009, Malte Meinshausen and his colleagues published an article in the 
prestigious journal Nature that attempted to calculate a “carbon budget” based 
upon the international consensus that global atmospheric temperatures should 
be kept below 2 degrees Celsius of warming. While, the authors noted, this is 
not a “safe” level of warming because it will still create profound impacts on 
ecosystems and human communities, it nonetheless had “gained increasing 
prominence in science and policy circles as a goal to prevent dangerous climate 
change” (Meinshausen et al., 2009, p. 1159). Based on extensive climate modeling, 
the authors determined that human societies have only a limited ceiling on 
the gigatons of carbon that they can emit into the atmosphere without soon 
exceeding the 2 degrees of warming level. In fact, at current rates of emissions, 
these researchers determined that we are well on our way to exceed these levels 
within the next few decades. Most importantly, these scientists also ran models 
that included the potential emissions from economically viable reserves in oil, 
gas, and coal around the world. They found that emissions from burning these 
underground reserves would “vastly exceed the allowable CO2 emission budget 
for staying below 2° C” (ibid., p. 1160).
The paper gained a great deal of attention among climate scientists, but was 
also popularized outside academic audiences when its findings were discussed 
in the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2009 report, which 
summed up the findings by stating that “we are currently eating into these CO2 
budgets at a disproportionate rate” (IEA, 2009, p. 193). A main reason for the 
delay in bringing carbon emissions in line with the internationally agreed upon 
carbon budget is, according to the IEA report, capital that is sunk into carbon-
intensive technologies, effectively “locking in” companies to high-carbon futures.
A group of environmentally minded financial analysts at Carbon Tracker grabbed 
hold of this perspective in 2011. They scoured public records to determine the 
size of the proven oil, gas, and coal reserves claimed by the world’s largest publicly 
traded fossil fuel corporations. They then calculated the carbon equivalents of the 
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reserves held by the 200 largest of these companies. The researchers found that 
these companies alone held five times more carbon in their reserves than could be 
emitted without pushing beyond the “carbon budget” that would keep warming 
below 2 degrees Celsius. The Carbon Tracker report concluded therefore that at 
least 80 percent of these fossil fuels are “unburnable carbon,” or that they are at 
least unburnable if governments hope to keep warming below catastrophic levels 
(Leaton, 2011). As financial specialists, the analysts were therefore concerned 
that contemporary financial markets have a “carbon bubble” because they accord 
value to energy companies based on reported fossil fuel reserves that must be left 
in the ground, rendering them valueless or at least worth far less than that which 
the market currently accords them.
Climate leader Bill McKibben drew attention to this report, however, as a means 
to both understand the dynamics of our environmental crisis and to propose a 
citizens’ movement that could push for solutions. In his widely read 2012 article 
in Rolling Stone, McKibben argued that coal, oil, and gas companies have a 
business model that commits them to bringing all the world’s fossil fuels onto the 
market, which will result in the production of carbon emissions that will radically 
transform the climate and threaten human existence. And while these publicly 
traded companies already claim ownership of fossil fuel reserves that far exceed 
the world’s carbon budget, these companies’ business model also brings them 
into partnerships with governments—such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran—that 
hold even greater reserves of fossil fuels.
To McKibben (2012), these are businesses whose activities are incompatible 
with life as we know it on Earth. Despite a decades-old scientific consensus 
on anthropogenic global warming, the world’s largest fossil fuel companies are 
nonetheless committed to a business model of unrestrained, or only weakly 
restrained, fossil fuel extraction and combustion. Their profitably depends upon 
it. They have sunk capital into exploration and into the development of their fossil 
fuel reserves. And their shareholder value would plummet if they were forced to 
leave much of their carbon reserves underground. Consequently, they are fighting 
to protect their continued ability to transform the climate, which their business 
model demands, in ways that will result in profound, and otherwise avoidable, 
human suffering. In so doing, major fossil fuel companies are disproportionately 
contributing to the structural violence of climate change.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014), 
pushing beyond 2  degrees Celsius of warming creates “considerable” risk that 
people will die, be injured, or have their livelihoods disrupted due to increasing 
coastal and inland flooding. Likewise, there are considerable risks of “extreme 
weather events leading to breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical 
services such as electricity, water supply, and health and emergency services” 
(ibid., p. 13). Moreover, food insecurity is predicted to increase, along with death 
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and sickness from increasing periods of extreme heat. While such impacts will 
happen even by keeping within the 2 degrees Celsius threshold, they will become 
more extensive as the atmosphere is warmed beyond this level. To put this 
more bluntly, the lives of hundreds of millions of people—in some cases whole 
societies—will be impacted.
Despite these consequences, major fossil fuel companies are fighting hard to 
preserve their business model, and have exerted considerable political influence 
to defeat or weaken efforts to limit carbon emissions around the world. Within 
the United States alone, oil, gas, and coal mining companies spent more than 
US$141 million on lobbying to influence Congress and federal agencies in 2014, 
which works out to more than US$386,000 per day, according to the Center for 
Responsive Politics (2016). This figure does not include the federal lobbying 
of electricity utilities, which in the United States have also vigorously opposed 
carbon emission limits. This figure also leaves out the vast amounts of money 
these companies have paid to promote oil, gas, and coal extraction at the state 
level of government.
Beyond lobbying to fight carbon emissions, large oil, gas, and coal companies 
are major campaign contributors to United States elections. The Center for 
Responsive Politics estimates that these companies gave close to US$74 million to 
bankroll the campaigns of political candidates in the 2014 election. Clearly, large 
fossil fuel companies give contributions for a number of reasons. An empirical 
investigation by Long et al. (2012) for instance finds that coal companies increase 
political donations to weaken or avoid enforcement of environmental laws. It 
also stands to reason that they spend large sums to decrease political support 
for climate change legislation. This would certainly go a long way to help explain 
the United States Congress’s recalcitrance on the issue, despite public support for 
steeper emissions reductions.
Importantly, lobbying and campaign finance also help secure tens of billions 
of dollars in subsidies every year for major fossil fuel companies. To be exact, 
governments around the world spent a total of US$88 billion to subsidize 
exploration for new oil, gas, and coal reserves in 2013 (Bast et  al., 2014). But 
this is only a portion of the total amount of capital that fossil fuel companies 
invest to search out new reserves. In 2012 alone, the world’s largest 200 fossil 
fuel companies spent US$674 billion to hunt for new sources of oil, gas, and 
coal (Carbon Tracker, 2013). In other words, even as the largest fossil fuel 
companies in the world possess more than enough carbon underground to push 
atmospheric temperatures far beyond 2  degrees Celsius—which will result in 
death, displacement, and suffering—they are making huge investments to find 
yet more reserves.
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In addition to lobbying and providing campaign contributions to help defeat 
or weaken climate change legislation, fossil fuel companies and their individual 
owners/shareholders have played a major role in funding think tank–driven 
climate change denialism. In the United States, think tanks have mounted years-
long campaigns to convince the public that the science on global warming is 
unsettled or wrong (Freudenburg et al., 2008; Jacques et al., 2008; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2000). Elite-drive climate denialists further argue that, even if the science 
is correct, efforts to reduce carbon emissions would do more harm than good 
in terms of economic well-being (McCright & Dunlap, 2000). Climate change 
denialism has had the effect of “institutionalizing delay” on climate change 
mitigation by effectively polarizing the issue of climate change and by giving 
elected officials the political cover they need to vote against emission-reduction 
legislation (Brulle, 2014; McCright & Dunlap, 2011).
In summary then, major oil, gas, and coal corporations have played, and 
continue to play, a critical role in the unfolding crisis of climate change by both 
extracting and selling the fossil fuels that are driving global warming, but also by 
successfully working to defeat or water down public efforts to reduce fossil fuel 
dependency. Because this behavior will contribute to the deaths, displacement, 
and untold suffering climate change will ultimately cause, it can be seen as a 
form of structural violence. Of course, none of this is to say that major publicly 
traded fossil fuel companies are the only powerful organizations responsible 
for the structural violence of climate change. For instance, state-owned oil, gas, 
and coal companies—such as Saudi Aramco and major Chinese-controlled coal 
enterprises—and the governments of wealthy nations that are leading producers 
of fossil fuels—like Saudi Arabia, Canada, the United States, and Australia—play 
a role in contributing to climate violence as well (see for instance Mulvaney et al., 
2015).
In making the link to structural violence, I also want to stress that large publicly 
traded fossil fuel companies are not intentionally working to cause harm and 
suffering. In fact, given the prevailing legal, political, and economic structure 
of neoliberal capitalism, it would be extremely difficult—if not impossible—for 
them to act otherwise. These companies’ efforts to extract the fullest amount of 
fossil fuels that technological and market conditions will allow is economically 
rational, at least in the short term. If any large oil, gas, or coal company failed 
to do so, it would, after all, be outcompeted by other companies in cutthroat 
global markets. And given that it is legal to fund elections in order to influence 
law-making, in this case to defeat or weaken climate change legislation, it again 
is rational for these companies to take advantage of such opportunities. Clearly 
then, these companies have limited agency within the prevailing political 
economy. Getting different outcomes will require systemic changes. But this is a 
very large goal, and it is difficult to know where to begin.
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One starting place is to simply point out the ways that fossil fuel companies have 
disproportionately benefited from a carbon-intensive capitalism, and how they 
have led the largely effective opposition against efforts to diminish fossil fuel 
dependency. The overall point is that responsibility for the structural violence of 
climate change is not shared evenly. Unveiling the climate violence of powerful 
organizations, like major fossil fuel corporations, is important in order to counter 
biases in orthodox climate violence research. More importantly, it might have 
some resonance in larger political debates.
Politics, social science, and climate violence
There is a long-standing bias in the social sciences: the violence of the poor is 
subjected to intense scrutiny, while the violence of the powerful often evades 
attention. For example, it is well known to criminologists that white-collar 
crime—including corporate crime—is just as costly in terms of financial losses 
and losses in human lives compared to the crimes of the poor, but it receives 
only a tiny fraction of researchers’ attention (Stretesky et  al., 2013). Likewise, 
in making a case for a new green criminology, Lynch and his coauthors (2013, 
p. 998) write that, “green harm and [environmental] crime are more widespread, 
have more victims and produce more damage than crimes that ‘occur on the 
streets’.” Even so, green crime has been largely neglected by most criminologists. 
And scholars of state crime similarly point out that when governments make 
decisions to violate international laws in the process of invading other nations, 
such as the United States’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003, it results in the deaths 
of thousands of people and imposes heavy costs on public treasuries (Kramer 
et al., 2005). But again, for the most part state crime goes relatively understudied 
compared to the violence of the poor (see Rothe, 2009).
These kinds of biases mean that the social sciences often misread the world. 
Conversely, focusing greater attention to the violence of the powerful would 
produce a social science that is more reflective of the most prevalent forms of 
harm in contemporary society. But more importantly, white-collar criminologists, 
state-crime criminologists, and green criminologists also point out that the 
biases of orthodox criminology have ideological implications: By focusing only 
on the poor, the harm caused by the very powerful goes mostly unnoticed, and 
is therefore more easily reproduced. These radical criminologists are, in other 
words, trying to flip the script in traditional social science to work for a more 
sustainable and peaceful future (Lynch et al., 2013).
Similarly, I have argued for the need to upend climate violence research. While 
orthodox climate conflict researchers have produced a high-profile literature 
that links climate change with increased violence in the global South, there is 
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also a growing body of work that challenges such claims. Critics have conducted 
their own empirical tests, casting doubt on any strong climate change/conflict 
relationship. Critics also argue that orthodox climate violence researchers rely 
on a long-discredited environmental determinism, which largely reproduces 
colonial stereotypes about the ways that warmer climates supposedly influence 
behavior. According to critics, this research perspective is also ideological in its 
effect, as it “naturalizes” conflict in the global South while giving governments in 
the global North new justifications for militarism and foreign surveillance. I add 
to these criticisms by arguing that traditional climate violence research unduly 
focuses on the potential violence of the poor (those most vulnerable to global 
warming impacts) while ignoring the violence of powerful organizations that 
disproportionately benefit from, and have disproportionately sought to preserve, 
a carbon-dependent economy.
The world’s largest publicly traded fossil fuel companies have more than enough 
carbon reserves to push the climate into extremely dangerous levels of warming. 
These companies nonetheless remain committed to extracting their reserves, and 
are influencing public policy in order to protect their ability to do so. While fossil 
fuel companies are spending large amounts of money to influence politics, they 
are spending even larger sums on exploration in order to find yet more carbon 
reserves to add to those they already hold.
Ultimately, the consequences of this situation will be felt through rising sea levels, 
increasingly severe storms, heat waves, and droughts, all of which will harm 
people and cause suffering. As such, it constitutes a kind of violence, albeit one 
that is not caused by malevolence, nor with intent. It is instead an unintended 
violence that will be increasingly felt over generations to come. Any sense of 
proportion insists that attention to the potential climate violence of the poor 
should not overshadow the preventable harm created through climate change 
itself. But attending to the structural violence of climate change is not purely 
a scholarly issue, and naming those organizations most responsible for global 
warming could help advance political campaigns to reduce carbon emissions.
A carbon divestment movement is mobilizing based on both awareness of the 
limited nature of the world’s remaining “carbon budget” and awareness that 
publicly traded fossil fuel companies hold enough carbon reserves to far surpass 
this threshold and push Earth’s climate into uncharted territory. Members of 
this movement are working to encourage their city governments, churches, and 
universities to pull their investments from the world’s largest fossil fuel companies, 
and they have had some notable successes so far (see Divestment Commitments, 
2015). Members of this movement understand full well that their strategy will 
not bankrupt these very large and very profitable corporations. Their strategy 
instead is to tarnish the public image of fossil fuel companies, and by so doing 
diminish their political power. If these companies are successfully stigmatized, so 
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the hope goes, they may not have the same capacity to successfully push back on 
carbon emission limits and other needed environmental reforms. The strategy is 
imperfect, but many important environmental thinkers today argue that it is the 
best hope we have of creating the climate justice movement necessary to achieve 
a less disastrous environmental future. Naming the climate violence produced by 
these companies for what it is might further this cause, and might be one small 
contribution from the social sciences to the divestment movement.
The larger point is that, while the structural violence of global warming might be 
felt through changes in the weather, it is not like the weather itself, in the sense 
that it is outside human control. Researchers studying the potential climate-
related violence of the poor often presume that, because a certain amount 
of climate change is “locked in” due to the carbon emissions already in the 
atmosphere, increasing conflict is inevitable. But this does not need to be the 
case. Governments and publics can respond to changing atmospheric conditions 
in numerous ways, some of which are more or less just, some of which are more 
or less likely to further enflame tensions in potential conflict zones. But just as 
importantly, governments and publics can put an end to the structural violence 
of climate change by moving to aggressively cut carbon emissions and by making 
the monumental investments in a green infrastructure necessary to achieve a less 
carbon-intensive economy. Naming the violence of climate change as such might 
be helpful in this difficult work ahead.
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